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Introduction
The end of the "Cold War" presents an historic opportunity to
advance the international rule of law by establishing an international
criminal court to preserve peace, advance the protection of human
rights and reduce international and transnational criminality.
The idea for such a court is not new and the efforts to establish
it have increased over the years. All of the precedents, however, have
been ad hoc international tribunals which ceased to exist when the
specific function or purpose for which they were designed ended. But
the important legal fact is that they existed, albeit with all the weaknesses
and shortcomings of having been hastily established, created for a single
adjudicating purpose and temporary in nature. Nevertheless, these
precedents are the backdrop of international experience which must
now ripen into a permanent international adjudicating structure designed to apply international criminal law with consistency and objectivity, and by means of fair process.
Historical Background
It can be said that the first international criminal court was established in 1474 in Breisach, Germany, where 27 judges of the Holy
Roman Empire judged and condemned Peter von Hagenbach for his
violations of the "laws of God and man" because he allowed his troops
to rape and kill innocent civilians and pillage their property.' Since
then, a number of similar precedents have taken place and moreover,
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a number of initiatives for a permanent international criminal court
have been developed. (See Appendix I for the chronology of these
initiatives.)
-After World War I, the Treaty of Versailles provided for the prosecution of Kaiser Wilhelm 112 and for an international tribunal to try
German war criminals. 3 After the war, the Kaiser fled to the Netherlands
where he obtained refuge, but the Allies, who had no genuine interest
4
in prosecuting him, abandoned the idea of an international court.
Instead, they allowed the German Supreme Court sitting at Leipzig
to prosecute a few German officers. 5 The Germans criticized the proceedings because they were only directed against them and did not
apply to Allied personnel who also committed war crimes. More troublesome, however, was the Allies' failure to pursue the killing of a
then estimated 600,000 Armenians in Turkey. 6 The 1919 Commission
on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs of War,
which investigated the responsibility of those who violated the laws of
war, recommended the prosecution of responsible Turkish officials and
by doing so, the notion of "crimes against humanity" became a legal
reality. 7 Strange as it may seem today, the United States, at that time,
opposed such prosecution on the technical legal argument that no such
crime yet existed under positive international law. 8 Consequently, the
-Treaty of S~vres (1923), which was to serve as a basis for Turkish
prosecutions, was never ratified, 9 and its replacement, the Treaty of

2. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany
(Treaty of Versailles), 28 June 1919, 11 Martens NoUVEAU RECUEIL DES TRAITES (3d)
323, art. 227.
3.

Id., art. 228.

4. See generally J.F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERo (1982); see "also,Wright,
The Legality of the Kaiser, 18 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 121 (1919).
5. See C. MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921). The two major prosecutions
were "The Dover Castle," (reprinted in 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1922)), and "The

Llandovery Castle," (reprinted in 16 Am. J.

INT'L

L. 708 (1922)).

6. See generally Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and InternationalLaw:
The World War I Armenian Case and its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L

L. 221 (1989).
7. Report of the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the
War and on Enforcement of Penalties for Violations of the Laws and Customs of
War, Conference of Paris 1919, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division
of International Law, Pamphlet No. 32 (1919), reprinted in 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95

(Supp. 1920).
8.
9.

Id., Dissent of the United States, at 58 (of Pamphlet No. 32).
The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of
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Lausanne (1927), gave the Turks amnesty.' 0 Thus, the first of many
mass killings in this century - atrocities now commonly referred to
as genocide" -

remained unpunished. Nevertheless, one can assume

that the granting of amnesty constituted implicit legal blameworthiness;
i.e., amnesty is only granted for a crime. The reluctance to recognize

S~vres), 10 August 1920, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (Supp. 1921) (not ratified). See in
particular arts. 226-230. Article 226 provides:
The Turkish Government recognises the right of the Allied Powers to bring
before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation
of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be
sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Turkey or
in the territory of her alies.
The Turkish Government shall hand over to the Allied Powers or to such
one of them as shall so request all persons accused of having committed an
act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specified either by
name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the Turkish
authorities.
See generally Matas, Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity: The Lessons of World War 1, 13
FORD. INT'L L. J. 86 (1989).
10. In fact, the treaty did not even address the question of prosecuting war
criminals. Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne),
24 July 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (Supp. 1924). See
generally, Garer, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 14 AM.
J. INT'L L. 70 (1920).
11. See Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of the Crime of Genocide,
9 Dec. 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, reprinted in'45 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1951). Article
II defines genocide as follows:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
On its face, this definition excludes mass killings which are committed without
the accompanying intent to destroy a group "in whole or in part." See Bassiouni,
Introduction to the Genocide Convention, in 1 M.C. BAssiouNi, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw: CRIMas 281 (1986). See also, E. ARONEAU, LE CRiME CoNTRE L'HuMANiTE (1961);
P. DRosr, THE CRmp oF STATE (1959); Bassiouni, InternationalLaw and the Holocaust,
9 CAL. Wj. INT'L L. 201, 250 (1979); Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime Under International
Law, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1944).
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"crimes against the laws of humanity" in the post-World War I era
as prosecutable and punishable international crimes came back to haunt
the very same Allies, and particularly the United States, after World
War II.
-In 1937, the League of Nations adopted a Convention Against Terrorism. The Protocol to this Convention contained a Statute for an
International Criminal Tribunal; however, India was the only country
to ratify it and the Convention never entered into effect. 1 2 Since then,
the world has been plagued with all sorts of terror-violence, producing
significant victimization, and as a consequence, a number of international Conventions on the subject have been adopted but none contained a provision for the establishment of an international criminal
court as did the 1937 Convention. 13 Once again the short-sightedness
of public officials prevented the taking of that additional step which
many felt to be necessary. 4
-After World War II, the Allies established two international tribunals
-

at Nuremberg"5 and Tokyo 16 -

to try major war criminals; however,

12. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court. Opened
for signature at Geneva, Nov. 16, 1937, League of Nations O.J. Spec. in Supp. No.
156 (1938), League of Nations Doc. C.547(I).M.384(I).1937V. (Never entered into
force); reprinted in 7 INTERNATIONAL LEoISLATION (1935-37), 878 (M. Hudson ed. 1972).
13. See Convention for the Suppression of Urlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 Dec.
1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Conyention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 Sept. 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 14 Dec. 1973, T.I.A.S. No. 8532; International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages, 18 Dec. 1979, G.A. Res. 34/145 (XXXIV), 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46), at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/146; Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil Aviation, 24 Feb. 1988, 27
I.L.M. 627 (1988); Convention and Protocol from the International Conference on
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 Mar.
1988, I.M.O. Doc. SVA/CON/15.
14. See INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES, (M.C. Bassiouni ed.
1975). In particular, see "Final Document: Conclusions and Recommendations" (of
the participants to the International Conference on Terrorism and Political Crimes,
held at the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, June 4-16,
1973), at xi-xxii.
15. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals
of the European Axis (London Agreement), 8 Aug. 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat.
1544, E.A.S. No. 472 (entered into force, 8 Aug. 1945), and the annexed Charter of
the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg). See generally, TIAL OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

(1949),

known as the "Blue Series." The ensuing trials were published under the tide, TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNAL

(1949), known as the

1991]

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

the absence of a strong precedent in the post-World War I era weakened
the legality of the process. Even worse was the absence of prosecution
of Allied military personnel for war crimes. These and subsequent
prosecutions became tainted with the claim of "victor's vengeance,"
although the legitimacy of prosecuting such offenders by far outweighed
the legal weaknesses of the process and certainly outweighed nonprosecution. Subsequent to Nuremberg and Tokyo, the Allies established war crimes tribunals in their respective zones of occupation in
Germany and tried over 20,000 war criminals. 17 Germany then took
over the task of prosecuting offenders found in its territory. 8 Formerly
occupied countries of Europe also prosecuted Germans and their own
nationals who collaborated with the occupiers. In some countries, the
process continues. Suffice it to recall: Israel's Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law,1 9 under which there were two landmark

"Green Series." For an account of the trial and the accused, see E. DAVIDSON, THE
For a legal appraisal and description of the proceedings,
see R. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960); J. KEENAN
&B. BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL LAW (1950); S. GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS,
THEIR PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT (1944).
16. International Military Tribunal for the Far East: (a) Special Proclamation:
Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East; (b) The Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, 19 Jan. 1946 (Geneial
Order No. 1), as amended 26 Apr. 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in 4 TaxRATms
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE U.S.A., 1776-1949 20 (C.I. Bevans
ed. 1968).
17. "Control Council Law No. 10" (Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity), adopted at Berlin, 20 Dec.
1945, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY, No. 3, Berlin, 31
Jan. 1946, reprinted in 1 B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 488 (1980).
TRIAL OF THE GERMANS (1966).

See

A. MAUNOIR, LA REPRESSION DEs CRIMES DE GUERRE DEVANT LES TRIBUNAUX
FRANCAIS ET ALLIES (1956); HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

(Wright ed. 1948); Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in 1 A TRATsE ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 559 (M.C. Bassiouni and V.P. Nanda eds. 1973);
Cowles, Trial of War Criminals (non-Nuremherg), 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 299 (1948). In the
post-Nuremberg prosecutions conducted in the occupied zones, the U.S. prosecuted

1814 persons (450 executed); the U.K. 1085 (240 executed); France, 2107 (109 executed). See Bierzanek, War Crimes: History and Definition, in 3 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT, (1987). The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have
prosecuted over 10,000 persons in Germany. No information is available on the number
of persons executed. The United Nations War Crimes Commission also reported a
number of other prosecutions in and throughout the European countries at war with
Germany in World War II.

18. See Weinschenck, Nazis Before German Courts: The West German War Crimes
Trials, 10 INT'L LAw. 515 (1976).
19. Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law-5710 (1950) 4 LAWS OF
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prosecutions, Eichmann 2° (convicted in 1961) and Demjanjuk 2' (convicted in 1989); in Yugoslavia where Artukovic - extradited in 1988
from the United States - was executed in 1989;2 in France, where
Barbie was convicted for the second time in 1989;23 in the United
States denaturalization and deportation of World War II criminals
continues; 24 and in Canada, where a 1987 law permits prosecution of
persons charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity;25 the
first case was decided in 1989.26 Prosecution of similar violations as
those occurring after World War II has not taken place on any sort
of consistent basis, notwithstanding many reported cases in regional
conflicts and other conflicts of a non-international character 27 For

THE STATE OF ISRAEL No. 64, at 154. See U.N. YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 163
(1950) for the English translation of that law.
20. Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann (Israel Dist. Court of Israel 1962),
36 I.L.R. 277 (1962). See generally G. HAUSER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM (1966).
21. Extradited from the U.S. to Israel, In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612
F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Oh. 1985), aff'd, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
22. Artukovic v. Rison, 628 F. Supp. 1370 (C.D. Calif. 1986), aft'd, 784 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1986).
23. See Matter of Barbie, Gaz. Pal. Jur. 710 (France Cass. crim. Oct. 6, 1983).
See also Le Gubehec, "Affaire Barbie" Gazette du Palais, No. 127-128, 106 e anne6,
Mercredi 7-Jeudi 8 Mai, 1985; and Angevin, "Enseignements de L'Affaire Barbie en
Matiere de Crimes Contre l'Humaniti," La Semaine Juridlque, 62e anne6, No. 5, 14
Dec. 1988 p. 2149; Doman, Aftermath of Nuremberg: The Trial'of Klaus Barbie, 60 CoLo.
L. REV. 449 (1989).
24. On the revocation of naturalization, see 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988). See also
Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and
InternationalLaw of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1977).
And see generally, A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN
AMERICA (1984) (examining the issue of war criminals who emigrated to the United
States and who now must confront their past).
25. See Act to amend the Criminal Code, ch. 37, 1987 Can. Stat. 1107. (Se
in particular § 1.96.). Also, Australia and the United Kingdom have passed or
considered similar legislation. In Australia: War Crimes Act 1988, No. 3 of 1989, 25
Jan. 1989; In the U.K. see WAR CRIMES: REPORT OF THE WAR CRIMES INQUIRY
(Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Home Department by Command
of Her Majesty, July 1989).
26. The Queen v. Imre Finta, Court File No. 30/88 (Sup. Ct. of Ontario,
1990).
27. See generally Mudge, Starvation as a Means of Warfare, 4 INT'L LAW. 228 (19691970) [Biafra; Nigeria]; KAMPUCHEA: DECADE OF THE GENOCIDE (K. Kiljunen ed.
1984); Frank & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of'Humanitarian Intervention by Military
Force, 67 AM. J. ITr'L L. 275 (1973); and Commentary, International Crimes Tribunal
in Bangladesh, 11 INT'L COMM. JUR. REV. 29 (N. MacDermot ed. 1973); Paust &
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example, only one conviction arose out of the Vietnam War. 2
-In 1948, the Genocide Convention recognized the jurisdiction of an
international criminal court, should one be established, but the Convention.did not require that such a court be established. 29 Since 1948,
however, mass killings have gone unpunished, including those resulting
from the internal conflicts in Biafra (Nigeria), Bangladesh and Kampuchea, where the killing is still ongoing."0
-As a result of the post-World War II prosecutions, the United Nations
established a Committee for the codification of "Offences Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind"3 1 and also to develop the statute for
an international criminal court. In 1951, such a draft statute was
prepared 32 and in 1953, it was amended, 3 but it has been tabled by

Blaustein, War Crimesjurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND J.
TRANS. L. 1 (1978); The Asia Watch Committee, KHMER ROUGE ABUSES ALONG THE
THAI-CAMBODIAN BORDER (1989). See also L. KUPER, GENOCIDE (1981).
28. U.S. v. Galley, 46 C.M.R. 1131 (1973), aff'd 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); see
also 2 L. FRIEDMAN, THE LAw OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1703 (1972)..
29. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
supra note 11, art. IV.
30. See supra note 27.
31. See generally Williams, The Draft Code Against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
in I M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 109 (1986).
32. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the Report
of the Committee on International Criminal Court Jurisdiction, 31 Aug. 1951), 7
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11), U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952), at 23. See also subsequent
Reports of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/2186
and U.N. Doc. A/2186/Add. 1. The discussions of the Sixth Committee and of the
General Assembly until the end of 1952 encompassed all three reports (U.N. Doc. A/
2136, U.N. Doc. A/2186, U.N. Doc. 2186/Add.1). See also Historical Survey of the
Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, AICN.4/7/Rev.1 (1949), reprinted in 1 B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 399 (1980). The chronology of relevant U.N. documents, reports and resolutions
are: Report of the International Law Commission on the Question of International
Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/15 (1950); Report of the International Law
Commission to the U.N. General Assembly on the Question of International Criminal
Justice, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), at 18, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950); Report of
the Sixth Committee to the U.N. General Assembly concerning the Report of the
International Law Commission on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction
(U.N. Doc. A/1316), 5 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/1639 (1950); Report on the
International Criminal Jurisdiction, 7 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 11), U.N. Doc. A/
2136 (1951) (Final).
33. Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction to
the Sixth Committee, 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12), at 23, U.N. Doc. A/2645
(1953); Report of the Sixth Committee to the U.N. General Assembly considering the
(Final) Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction (U.N.
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the General Assembly ever since.
-In 1972, the Apartheid Convention provided for the establishment of
an international criminal jurisdiction.3 4 In 1980, at the request of the
Commission on Human Rights, I prepared a draft statute for an
international criminal tribunal to prosecute apartheid violators, but the
35
project thus far has not been acted upon.
-In 1989 and 1990, the General Assembly requested the International
Law Commission to report on the establishment of an international
criminal court to prosecute persons engaged in the international trafficking of drugs. 36 Pursuant to that call, the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa), in cooperation with
the United Nations Crime Prevention Branch and the Italian Ministry

Doc. A/2645), 9 U.N. GAOR Supp., U.N. Doc. A/2827/Corr. 1 (1954); G.A. Res.

898 (X), U.N. Doc. A/RES./266 (1954) (tabling the Report of the 1953 Committee
on International Criminal Jurisdiction); G.A. Res. 1187 (XII), 12 U.N. GAOR (1957)
(tabling the Report of the Sixth Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction,
U.N. Doc. A/3771 (1957)).
34. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime

of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), at 75, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974), arts. V, IX.
35. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.22/C.R.P. 19 (1980), "Study on ways and means
of insuring the implementation of international instruments such as the International

Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, including
the establishment of the international jurisdiction envisaged by the Convention," U.N.

Doc. E/CN.4/1426, (1980). See also Bassiouni & Derby, Final Report on the Establishment
of an InternationalCriminal Courtfor the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other
Relevant InternationalInstruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. R.v. 523 (1981).
36. G.A. Res. 43/164 (1988) and 44/39 (1989). And, in particular, see Agenda
item 152 entitled International Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities Engaged in
Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs Across National Frontiersand Other Transnational Criminal

Activities Establishment of an International Criminal Court with Jurisdiction Over Such Crimes,
Report of the Sixth Committee to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/44/770 (1989). See also
Adoption of a PoliticalDeclarationand a Global Programmeof Action, Draft global programme

of action by the Bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Seventeenth Special Session
of the General Assembly (Item 14 of the provisional agenda), U.N. Doc. VA/S-17/
AC.11L.2 (1990), which at paragraph 80 provides:
Since the International Law Commission has been requested to consider
the question of establishing an international criminal court or other international trial mechanism with jurisdiction over persons alleged to be engaged
in illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs across national frontiers, the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination shall consider, in its annual adjustments to the United Nations system-wide action plan on drug abuse control
requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 44/141 of 15 December
1989, the report of the International Law Commission on the question.
See generally, 84 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 930, 930-933 (1990).
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of Justice, convened a committee of experts in June 1990 to prepare
such a draft statute. The Committee approved the document I prepared"7

37. The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court is based on the
earlier proposal prepared by this author for the United Nations to prosecute apartleid
violators. See supra note 35. Thereafter the Draft Statute was amended and published
in M.C. BAssiouNs, A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL (1987). In preparation for the Siracusa meeting the Draft

Statute was discussed at a meeting convened by Senator Arlen Specter:
But, the ILC is not the only forum for discussion of this proposal. Commencing
later [sic] month in Italy, the International Institute of Higher Studies in
Criminal Sciences in cooperation with the United Nations Crime Prevention
Branch on Penal Codes will focus primary attention on the issue of creation
of an international criminal court. And, in August, the United Nations' 8th
Congress on Crime Prevention will also focus debate on the creation of such
a court. Clearly, the progress made on the need for and creation of international criminal court has taken a quantum leap forward.
In sum, it is clear that there is broad agreement on the definition and threat
posed by drugs and drug trafficking leading to the United Nations adoption
on December 20, 1988 of the Convention against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. In spite of several international conventions on aviation, maritime safety and hostage-taking, there is less agreement
on the definition of terrorism. While both represent a very serious problem
to safety and security, the development of a regional international criminal
court focusing on drugs and international drug trafficking, in my view, offers
a start in establishing and developing the international criminal court system.
In closing, I wish to support the effort of the forthcoming fora in their efforts
to create an international criminal court. In the months ahead I shall be
introducing a new legislative proposal to move the United States closer to a
more active role in the formulation of an international criminal court.
Mr. President, I would be gravely remiss if I did not recognize the extensive
scholarship contributed by Cherif Bassiouni, professor of law at DePaul
University College of Law to the development of an international criminal
court and code. Professor Bassiouni's counsel and dedication have been a
source of inspiration and guidance to this Senator and indeed to the community
of international criminal lawyers and scholars. His competence and vision as
an international criminal law scholar are universally shared. I thank him
publicly for his contributions and leadership in this matter and look forward
to greater cooperation with him in the formulative period ahead.
136 CoNG. REC. S8080 (daily ed. June 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Specter).
And also, after the Siracusa Conference:
[A] special committee of experts organized by the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences under the auspices of the Italian Ministry
of Justice and in cooperation with the United Nations Crime Prevention and
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with minor changes and the text was submitted to the Eighth United
Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders
held in Havana, Cuba, August-September,

1990.

3

1

-The Eighth Congress debated the subject and that discussion was
summarized in its report as follows:
There was a need to develop clear ideas and a firm attitude
on international co-operation, free of isolationism while respecting the sovereignty of States. Some delegations considered
that the threat of major international crimes necessitated the
establishment of an international criminal court. It would serve
as an instrument for the defence of international peace and
parsecurity, without which the sovereignty of some States,
39
ticularly small States, could be placed in jeopardy.
The Congress, however, resolved as follows:
The International Law Commission should be encouraged to
continue to explore the possibility of establishing an international criminal court or some other international mechanism
to have jurisdiction over persons who have committed offences
(including offences connected with terrorism or with illicit
trafficking in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances), in
accordance with General Assembly resolution 44/39 of 4 December 1989. Similarly, and in the light of the report that
the International Law Commission will submit on this particular subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session,
the possibility might be considered of establishing an international criminal court or appropriate mechanism with each
and all of the procedural and substantive arrangements that
might guarantee both its effective operation and absolute respect for the sovereignty and the territorial and political integrity of States and the self-determination of peoples. States
Criminal Justice Branch held a symposium in Siracusa, Italy. The Institute
urged establishment of the court, drafted a model statute for such a court and
presented its recommendations to the Eighth United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders which met in August.
136 CONo. REc. S18160 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (statement of Sen. Specter).
38. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 144/NGO 7, Draft Statute: International Criminal Tribunal
(1990), Item 5, reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REv. 375 (1991). See also Bassiouni, A Comprehensive Strategic Approach on International Cooperation for the Prevention, Control
and Suppression of International and Transnational Criminality, Including the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 15 NOVA L. Rev. 353 (1991).
39. Report of the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 144/28, at 227, (1990).
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could also explore the possibility of establishing separate international criminal courts of regional or sub-regional jurisdiction in which grave international crimes, and particularly
terrorism, could be brought to trial and the incorporation of
such courts within the United Nations system. 40
-In July 1990, the International Law Commission completed a report
and submitted it to the 1990 session of the General Assembly.4 1 It
expressed a positive view on the feasibility of such a court with juris'
diction over "Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind. 2
All these efforts have brought us closer to realizing the expectations
of so many who believe that some form of international adjudication
for international and transnational crimes may be forthcoming. But so
far the political will of the world's major powers has been lacking, and
progress toward that goal is slow though growing.
Political, Practical and Technical Legal Considerations
The obstacles to the establishment of an international criminal
court fall essentially into three categories: (1) political; (2) practical;
and, (3) legal-technical. Of these three, the political factor is the most
significant, followed by the practical one, while the legal-technical one
does not pose any serious difficulties.
The political factor stems essentially from objections generated by
those who adhere to a rigid conception of sovereignty, even though
such conceptions have been dipassi in so many other areas of international law, particularly with respect to the international and regional
protections of human rights embodied in conventional and customary
international law. The real opposition, however, comes from government officials who fear two types of situations.
The first is the risk that they and other senior officials, especially
heads of state, can be called to answer for their acts which may constitute
international violations and which .would be subject to the Court's
jurisdiction. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the Nuremberg43
and Tokyo4 international military tribunals, and the United Nations'

40. Id., at 193-4.
41. See supra note 36, and accompanying text.
42. International Law Commission, Forty Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
430/Add.1 (1990) Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind.

43. See supra note 15.
44.

See supra note 16.
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subsequent affirmation of the Nuremberg principles, removed the immunity of heads of states and negated other defenses, such as "obedience
to superior orders." 4 5
Since World War II a number of instances have come to world
public attention indicating that heads of state and senior government
officials have engaged in or supported the commission of such international crimes as aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, apartheid, slavery and slave-related practices, international
trafficking in drugs, aircraft hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats, taking
of civilian hostages and torture. And while the world community expresses abhorrence of some of these crimes, and outrage about others,
little if anything is done, other than pious denunciations, and occasionally, some condemnatory resolutions by the United Nations and
other international bodies.
The political problem is obvious. Heads of states and senior government officials have historically wanted to shield themselves from any
form of international accountability. Their successors and even their
opponents so frequently cover up for them for fear that they too may
find themselves in a similar situation, or because they feel that domestic
political peace may warrant it. This was evident when Bangladesh did
not carry out its intended prosecution of Pakistanian military personnel
6
after the independence of that region, which was once part of Pakistan.4
It was also the case when Argentina, after prosecuting some officers
for the estimated 15,000 desaparecidos between 1976-1983, passed an
amnesty law on December 29, 1990.47
During the "cold war" (1948-1989) countries on both sides of the
then "iron curtain" perceived the exigencies of national security at
precluding consideration of an international criminal court that would
deal with such international crimes as aggression and terrorism. But
the real reason was that the two superpowers engaged in acts violating
international criminal law, as did their surrogates, satellites and respective friendly countries. Exaggerated as these claims of national
45.

See Affirmation of the Principles of InternationalLaw Recognized by the Charter of

Nuremberg Tribunal G.A. Res. 95 (I) U.N. Doc. A/64 Add. 1 (1946); Principles of
InternationalLaw Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of
the Tribunal (International Law Commission), 5 U.N. GAOR (No. 12), 11 U.N. Doc.
A/1316 (1950). Also, in 1968, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Non-

Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humaniy, 26 Nov.
1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969).
46. See Frank & Rodley, Paust & Plaustein, supra note 27.
47. See Timerman, Fear Returns to Argentina New York Times, Jan. 5, 1991, at
.13, col. 1.
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security were, and certainly as they now appear to be, the argument
of national security was frequently used to rationalize the commission
of international crimes ranging from aggression to torture. Even now,
public officials in countries which resort to, or allow torture, rationalize
it on the grounds of national security or public necessity. 4 Strange as
it may seem, the efforts of public officials to shield themselves from
accountability, whether heads of state or. simple police officers, has
consistently been the same for as long as there is a record of these
occurrences. They invariably argue that their action was necessary in
order to protect or save the nation, or to advance its vital or national
security interests.
Another argument advanced against such a court, as well as another
risk perceived by public officials, is the apprehension that an international adjudication body can, for purely political reasons, embarrass
governments and public officials. But surely sufficient safeguards could
be developed to prevent such possibilities, much as certain mechanisms
have been developed in domestic legal systems to avoid abuse of power
through prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
Such issues as well as other legal-technical issues cannot be raised a
-priorito oppose the realization of the idea. They are valid concerns to
be raised in the context of drafting the norms and provisions of an
international criminal court system so as to develop appropriate safeguards. It is, therefore, more likely that this argument is raised in
order to obfuscate the fact that the former one (to shield public officials)
is the real reason for the opposition to the idea.
Practical questions are also raised with frequency and have a ring
of authenticity to them, particularly to the non-initiated. Among these
questions are: where to locate the Court; how to secure the presence
of the accused to stand trial; how to select judges, etc. These and other
practical questions are no different than those which faced the drafters
of the 1899 Hague Convention establishing the Permanent Court of
Arbitration,49 or those of the 1920 Permanent Court of International
Justice and of the 1945 International Court of Justice, respectively part
of the League of Nations and United Nations Charters. Granted, these
tribunals were not set up for purposes of individual criminal prosecutions
and that there are peculiar problems to this type of adjudication, but

48.

See generally Bassiouni & Derby, 77m Crime of Torture, in 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI,
CRIMEs 363 (1986); TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES (An
Amnesty International Report, 1984).
49. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1799.
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political sensitivities about all forms of international adjudication are
similar. That is why both the PCIJ and the ICJ provide for the MemberStates the choice of compulsory or voluntary submission to jurisdiction. 0
In the case of an international criminal court having jurisdiction over
individuals, it would seem that these political sensitivities should be of
a lesser nature, except, of course, when it comes to prosecuting public
officials for crimes having political overtones or which are committed
pursuant to state-policy and particularly if the international criminal
court were to have exclusive jurisdiction.
The Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, which
I prepared in 1980 and which was revised and reviewed by the 1990
Siracusa Committee of Experts and then submitted to the Eighth United
Nations Congress, 51 addresses these concerns without compromising the
basic values and goals sought to be achieved by such a Tribunal.
Clearly, other solutions to practical and legal technical questions can
be developed, but the point is that these problems are not as difficult
to resolve as some government officials claim. They are not, therefore,
a valid reason for the refusal of establishing an international criminal
court.
Legal-technical issues are easily resolvable and many thoughtful
models have been developed by the League of Nations, the United
52
Nations, non-governmental organizations and individual scholars.
(Some of these questions are discussed below when the "Proposed
Model" is examined.)
Recent Developments
In the last three years, the question of establishing an international
criminal court has emerged at the highest political levels in the world
and renewed interest has been expressed by world leaders and by the
53
United Nations.
As early as 1987, President Gorbachev expressed support for such
a court, but with jurisdiction limited to terrorism.5 4 In the United

50. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36. For a case which
examines the Court's jurisdictional issues, see MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES
IN AND AGAINST NICARAGUA 1986. I.C.J. 14. See generally, Maier, Appraisals of the ICJ's
Decision: Nicaragua o. United States, 81 AM. J. IN'r'L L. 77 (1987).
51. See supra notes 37-39.
52. See e.g., supra notes 32, 33 and 35, infra note 71 and the Appendix.
53. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text and infra notes 54-56, 65 and
accompanying text.
54. Pravda Sept. 16, 1987.
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States, Senator Arlen Specter has been, since 1986, a constant advocate
of such a court, 55 as have Congressmen Leach and Kastenmeier in the
House. 56 In fact, the United States Congress has urged the establishment
of an international criminal court, but only with regard to international
terrorism and international trafficking in drugs. In 1986, as part of
5
the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986,'
Congress called upon the President to "consider including on the agenda
for these negotiations [regarding an international convention to prevent
and control all aspects of international terrorism,] the possibility of

eventually establishing an international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists. " 5 8 Also, in 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988,59 which also asserts the need for some sort of international tribunal
to handle cases of drug trafficking. It provides that:
It is the sense of the Senate that the President should begin
discussions with foreign governments to investigate the feasibility and advisability of establishing an international criminal
court to expedite cases regarding the prosecution of persons
accused of having engaged in international drug trafficking
or having committed international crimes. 60
Even more recently, Congress, at the behest of Senator Specter,
amended the "Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1991,"61 and provided:
(a)

The Congress finds that-

55.

Supra note 37; see also Appendix II.

56.

H.R. Con. Res. 66, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). In recognition of the

efforts of Congressmen Leach and Kastenmeier, Senator Specter stated in the Con-

gressional Record, October 25, 1990, supra note 37:
First and foremost, I wish to recognize the great contribution made by

Congressman Jim Leach, Congressman Bob Kastenmeier and their staffs
on behalf of this legislation regarding the creation of an international

criminal court. Their efforts in the House of Representatives have served
as inspiration for this Senator to continue ahead in the unchartered waters
surrounding this issue. Their House Concurrent Resolution 66, which they
introduced on March 2, 1989, served as a source of reassurance to my
past resolutions and in my crafting of amendment No. 3068.

57.
58.

PUB. L. No. 99-399 (1986).
Id., Title XII - Criminal Punishment of International Terrorism; S 1201

(Encouragement for Negotiation of a Convention) (d).
59. PUB. L. No. 100-690 (1988).
60. Id., Title IV International Narcotics Control, S 4108 (International Criminal

Court) (a).
61.

PuB. L. No. 101-513 (1990).
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the international community has defined as criminal
conduct in various international conventions, certain
acts such as war crimes, crimes against humanity,
torture, piracy and crimes on board commercial
vessels, aircraft hijacking and sabotage of aircraft,
crimes against diplomats and other internationally
protected persons, hostage-taking, and illicit drug
cultivation and trafficking;
(2) in spite of these international conventions, the effective prosecution of those who commit criminal
acts has been seriously obstructed in certain cases
because of problems of extradition and differences
between the legal and judicial systems of individual
nations;
(3) the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
extends only to cases involving governments, and
not to individual criminal cases;
(4) the concept of an international criminal court has
been under consideration in the United Nations and
other international fora for many years, including
proposals and reviews undertaken in 1990 by the
United Nations General Assembly, the International
Law Commission, and the Eighth United Nations
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders;
(5) the international military tribunals established in
Nuremburg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, following
World War II also establish a precedent for international criminal tribunals; and
(6) there is growing movement among nations of the
world to formulate their economic, political and legal
systems on a multilateral basis.
(b) It is the sense of Congress that(1) the United States should explore the need for the
establishment of an International Criminal Court
on a universal or regional basis to assist the international community in dealing more effectively with
criminal acts defined in international conventions;
and
(2) the establishment of such a court or courts for the
more effective prosecution of international criminals
should not derogate from established standards of
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due process, the rights of the accused to a fair trial
and the sovereignty of individual nations.
(c) The President shall report to the Congress by October
1, 1991, the results of his efforts in regard to the establishment of an International Criminal Court to deal with
criminal acts defined in international conventions.
(d) The Judicial Conference of the United States shall report
to the Congress by October 1, 1991, on the feasibility
of, and the relationship to, the Federal judiciary of an
62
International Criminal Court.
As for the Bush Administration, it has stressed international cooperation against terrorism and trafficking in drugs, but it seems, at
this point, reluctant to support an international court to prosecute such
offenders. 63 (For a chronology of U.S. developments regarding an international criminal court see Appendix II.)
As for other countries, France and the United Kingdom have an
ambiguous position. At the 1990 Eighth United Nations Congress on
Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders, their representatives
joined efforts to lobby other Western European countries against a
resolution calling for the establishment of an international criminal
court, though both countries had previously voted favorably on two
resolutions in the General Assembly in 1989-90 supporting such an
idea.6 4 On the positive side, sixteen Caribbean and Latin American
countries have been supporting the idea since 1989. Trinidad and
Tobago has been in the forefront of this question, led by Prime Minister
A.N.R. Robinson, and since 1990, Columbia's President C. Oaviria
Trujillo has also strongly supported the idea.65 In response to such

62. Id., § 599 E (International Criminal Court).
63. On terrorism and drugs, see e.g., Bassiouni, Effective National and International
Action Against Organized Crime and Terrorist Criminal Activities, 4 EMORY INT'L L. Rlv. 9
(1990); Bassiouni, CriticalRe(Zections of InternationalandNational Control of Drugs, 18 DEN.

J. INT'L L. & POL. 311 (1990).
64. See supra note 36. At the Eighth United Nations Congress, see supra notes
38-40 and accompanying text; a number of countries made statements supporting'the
idea of an international criminal court. They are: Brazil, Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Israel, Poland, Romania, Trinidad and Tobago, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.
65. Agenda Item 152, referred to supra note 36, was introduced at the request
of Trinidad and Tobago, see G.A. Res. A/44/195 (1989) and in the Annex, an
explanatory memorandum by Ambassador Margorie Thorpe stated, in part, as follows:
The desirability and feasibility of an international criminal court to deal
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strong interest, the Organization of American States has begun studying
the possibility of a Regional Criminal Court for the Americas.6 The
Caribbean and Latin American countries show particular eagerness for
such a Court and they are understandably dismayed to see the disinterest
and opposition of other countries (particularly the U.S.) that are quick
to accuse them of not doing enough to control international trafficking
in drugs and terrorism.
Current international interests, however, seem to focus only on
drugs and terrorism. What is needed instead is an international criminal

with international criminal offences was the subject of much discussion even
before the establishment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
on 8 August 1946. It was envisaged then that the jurisdiction of an international
criminal court would cover individuals charged with violations of certain rules
of international law such as genocide. Such a proposal was formalized in
1951 and revised in 1954 by the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, established pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 489 (V) of
12 December 1950 and 687 (VII) of 5 December 1952 ....
The establishment Of an international criminal court with jurisdiction to
prosecute and punish individuals and entities who engage in, inter alia, the
illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs across national borders would serve to
bolster the legal process whereby such offenders are prosecuted and punished
and would also contribute substantially to the progressive development and
codification of international law.
With regard to Columbia, as Senator Specter notes in the Congressional Record:
Colombia is a vivid case in point. Extraditions to the United States have
had some positive effect on traffickers. But, these same extraditions represent
a serious political problem for the leadership of Colombia. Thus, in his August
7, 1990, Inauguration address, President Cesar Oaviria Trujillo vowed to
"explore the possibility of creating an international or regional criminal
jurisdiction to fight narco-trafficking and other related crimes that surpass
international borders."
136 CoNG. REc. S18160 (daily ed. October 25, 1990).
66. The fnter-American Juridical Committee of the OAS at its 1990 session,
held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (see document OEA/Ser. G, CP/doc.2113/90, Nov. 7,
1990, page 53). The motion to examine this topic was presented by the Argentine
member of the Committee, Dr. Jorge R. Vanossi, who was subsequently appointed
rapporteur together with Professor M. Vieira from Uruguay. In his introductory
statement, Dr. Vanossi made reference to the work undertaken by the International
Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, and to the preparatory work submitted
by Dr. Bassiouni (see 1990 Session of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, August
18 meeting, Minute No. 12). These documents will be an important source for the
Committee, which is expected to begin examination of the topic at the 1991 JulyAugust session. This information was provided by Ambassador Hugo Caminos, Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs, who is following this question at the OAS.
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court with universal jurisdiction to prosecute all or most of the 22
categories of international crimes covered by conventional and customary international law, including, but not limited to: 67 aggression (crimes
against peace); war crimes; crimes against humanity; genocide; apartheid;
slavery and slave-related practices; torture; unlawful human experimentation; piracy; hijacking and sabotaging of aircraft; kidnapping of
diplomats and other internationally protected persons; taking of hostages; and, criminal damage to the environment. The International
Law Commission has taken such a position in its 1990 Report to the
General Assembly, though the list of international crimes it has6 developed is different from the one proposed above by this writer.A
The ILC's 1990 position on such a Court is stated as follows:
1. Competence of the Court
(a) Jurisdiction limited to the crimes mentioned in the Code or
jurisdiction as to all internationalcrimes?
(i) Versions submitted
5. On this topic, the Special Rapporteur submits the following versions:
Version A: There is established an International Criminal Court
to try natural persons accused of crimes referred to in the
draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind.
Version B: There is established an International Criminal Court
to try. natural persons accused of crimes referred to in the
draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, or other offences defined as crimes by the other international instruments in force.

67.

See M.C.

TIONAL INSTRUMENTS

BAssIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL

CRiMEs: DIOEST/INDEX

OF INTERNA-

1815-1985 (1986). See also statement of Senator Specter, supra note

37:
Modem international criminal law can be said to have commenced in 1815
at the Congress of Vienna with efforts to abolish slavery. Since then 317
international instruments on substantive international criminal law have been

agreed to covering international crimes such as aggression, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, apartheid, torture, piracy on board commercial vessels,
aircraft hijacking, kidnapping of diplomats and other internationally protected

persons, taking of civilian hostages and environmental damages to name a
few.

68. See the International Law Commission's latest report (from its Forty-First
Session) to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.443 (1990).
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Commentaty

6. The question is whether international criminal jurisdiction
will be limited to the crimes referred to in the draft Code of
crimes against the peace and security of mankind, or whether
it will also encompass other international crimes which do not
fall within that category. As is well known, the Code does
not cover all international crimes. Among those not mentioned
therein are the dissemination of false or distorted news, or
false documents, by persons knowing that they will have an
adverse effect on international relations; insults to a foreign
State; the counterfeiting of currency; practiced by one State
to the detriment of another State, and the theft of national
or archaeological treasures; the destruction of submarine cables; international trafficking in obscene publications, etc.
7. Accordingly; the concept of an international crime is
broader than that of a crime against the peace and security
of mankind; it covers a wider field which includes all other
international crimes in addition to those defined in the draft
Code.
8. The question, therefore, is whether the jurisdiction of the
Court is limited to crimes against the peace and security of
mankind, or whether the Court will deal with all international
crimes.
9. It would seem preferable to confer the broadest possible
jurisdiction upon the Court; otherwise, it would be necessary
to establish two international criminal jurisdictions, which
would lead to complications.
(b) Necessity or non-necessity of the agreement of other States
(i)

Versions submitted

Version A: No person shall be tried before the Court unless
jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Court by the State
in which the crime was committed, or by the State of which
such person is a national, or by the State against which the
crime was directed, or of which the victims were nationals.
Version B: Any State may bring before the Court a complaint
against a person if the crime of which he is accused was
committed in that State, or if it was directed against that
State, or if the victims are nationals of that State. If one of
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the said States disagrees as to the jurisdiction of the Court,
the Court shall resolve the issue.
(ii)

Commentayy

11. Version A is based on article 27 of the draft statute
prepared by the 1953 Committee on International Criminal
Jurisdiction.6

9

Is it appropriate? From the legal point of view,

nothing prohibits a State from punishing crimes against its
own security, even if such crimes are committed abroad by
foreigners. Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, this solution would lead to requesting the consent of Governments
70
guilty of having organized or tolerated criminal acts.
Such a court is not only possible, it is quite feasible. All of the
foreseeable problems and difficulties have been thoughtfully dealt with
by a number of experts who have prepared detailed studies and examined alternative solutions to the various legal and practical questions.7 1

69. See Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction,
Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 12 (A/2645), annex,
article 27.
70. International Law Commission, Forty Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
430/Add.1 (1990) Eighth Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind.
1
71. See e.g., B. FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1980), which
provides a documentary examination of the historical evolution of international crimes
and the establishment of an international criminal court. Some scholars see the problem
both in terms of the political will of the most powerful governments and of the lack
of scholarly consensus on the broader issue of the scope and content of international
criminal law. See e.g., Friedlander, The Enforcement of InternationalCriminal Law: Fact or
Fiction, 17 CASE W. Ras. J. INT'L L. 79 (1985) (wherein the author re-examines Georg
Schwarzenberger's query about the existence of international criminal law); Friedlander,
71e Foundations of International Criminal Law: A Present Day Inquiry, 15 CASE W. REs.
J. INT'L L. 13 (1983); Green, Is There an International Criminal Law, 21 ALBERTA L.
REv. 251 (1983); Green, New Trends in International Criminal Law, 11 IsR. Y.B. HuM.
RTs. 9 (1981); Green, An International Criminal Code - Now? 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 560
(1976); Dinstein, InternationalCriminal Law, 5 IsR. Y.B. HUM. RTs. 55 (1975); Wright,
The Scope of International Criminal Law, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 562 (1975). See generally
Derby, A Frameworkfor International CriminalLaw, in 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: CuMa~s 33 (1986); Schwarzenberger, The Problem of International Criminal
Law, 3 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 263 (1950); Report of the International Law Commission on Questions of International Criminal jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15
(1950). See also Bassiouni & Derby, Final Report on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Courtfor the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant Instruments,
9 HOFs'rRA L. REv. 523 (1981); Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski, La Creation d'une Cour Phnal
Internationale et l'Administration Internationale de la Justice, 1977 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 253;
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Alternative Models
The formulae presented in the scholarly literature and proposals
advanced by different organizations range from the position of the
Association Internationale de Droit Penal, which since 1926, has urged
the establishment, by way of a treaty-statute (much like the Nuremberg
Charter and Tokyo Statute), of a universal, as opposed to a regional,
international criminal court having jurisdiction over all international
crimes, to that of the International Law Association, which has advocated an International Commission of Inquiry (See Appendix I).
Alternative approaches are based on an expanded concept of jurisdiction
discussed, since the 1970's, within the Council of Europe under the
rubrique "L'Espace Judiciaire Europien", which is still under consideration, and which has inspired the Commission of the Andean Parliament

The Creation of an International Criminal Court, in INTERNA(M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1975); Grebing,
La Creation d'une Cour Pnal Internationale: Bilan et Perspectives, 45 REv. INT'LE DE DROIT
PkNAL 435 (1974); Miller, Far Beyond Nuremberg: Steps Toward an International Criminal
Jurisdiction, 61 Ky. LJ. 925 (1973); Dautricourt, The Concept of International Criminal
Court Jurisdiction - Definition and Limitations of the Subject, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 636 (M.C. Bassiouni & V.P. Nanda eds. 1973); J. STONE
&" R. WOETZEL, TOWARD A FEASIBLE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1970); Klein
& Wilkes, United Nations Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court: An American
Evaluation, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 573 (G.O.W. Mueller & E. Wise eds.
(1965)); Ambion, Organizationof a Court of International CriminalJurisdiction, 29 PHIL L.
J. 345 (1954); P. CARJEU, PRojET D'UNE JURIDICTION PENALE INTERNATIONALE (1953);
Wright, Proposalfor an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1952); Finch,
Draft Statute for an International Court, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1952); Yeun-Li, The
Establishment of an International CriminalJurisdiction: The First Phase, 46 AM. J. INT'L L.
73 (1952); A. SOTTILE, THE PROBLEM OF THE CREATION OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT (1951); Pella, Towards an International Criminal Court, 44 AM. J. INT'L
L. 37 (1950); Pella, Plan d'un Code Repressif Mondial, 6 REv. INT'LE DE DROIT PfNAL
148 (1935). See Symposium issue 45 REv. INT'LE DE DROIT PANAL, Nos. 3-4 (1974)
Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski,
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(containing contributions for the Fifth U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the
Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 1-12 Sept. 1975; Symposium issue 20 REv. INT'LE
DE DROIT PgNAL, No. 1 (1949) (regarding the various U.N. drafts); Symposium issue
(with articles by Donnedieu de Vabres and Francis Biddle) 19 REV. INT'LE DE DROIT

No. 1 (1948); Symposium issue 17 REv. INT'LE DE DROIT PIENAL, Nos. 3-4
(1936). See Draft Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquirv and a Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court, International Law Association, 60th Conference,
PkNAL,

Montreal, Aug. 29 - Sept. 4, 1982, in Report of the 60th Conference of the International

Law Association (1983); Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Work Paper,
Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Aug. 26-31 (1973); Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court, Foundation for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Wingspread Conference, Sept. 1971).
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to consider the "Espacio Judiciario Andino. "' These approaches substitute expanded regional criminal jurisdiction for the idea of regional
or international adjudicating bodies. Thus, national criminal courts and
national structures of administration of criminal justice would remain
competent but they would be able to act even when the crime was not
committed within their territory. In fact, these schemes are not really
designed to expand the adjudication system, but they are a subterfuge
for allowing law enforcement agencies, now limited by territorial jurisdiction, to operate outside it. These approaches, while strengthening
law enforcement, do not accomplish the many goals of international
or regional adjudication, and consequently, should not be regarded as
valid alternatives. In addition, these schemes are fraught with dangers
to procedural safeguards on the extra-territorial activities of law
enforcement.
The establishment of an international criminal court, whether universal or regional, can be based on exclusive jurisdiction for certain
crimes or on concurrent or alternative jurisdiction with that of the state
having criminal jurisdiction. The jurisdictional mechanisms are, of
course, to be established by the treaty-statute.
The establishment of an international criminal court could admittedly be based on various models including, but not limited to:
i. Expanding the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice to include questions of interpretation and application
of conventional and customary international criminal law, and
providing for compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice for disputes between states arising out of these questions;
ii. Establishing an international commission of inquiry, either
as an independent organism, as part of the international criminal court or as an organ of the United Nations. Such a
commission would investigate and report on violations of international criminal law, taking into account the proposal of
the International Law Association and existing United Nations
experiences with fact-finding and inquiry bodies which have

72. See generally, Graefrath, Universal CriminalJurisdictionand an InternationalCriminal Court, I EUROPEAN J. INT'L L. 67, 81-85 (1990); see also Mosconi, L'Accordo di
Dublino del 4/12/79, Le ComunitaEuropee e La Repressione del Terrorisimo, in LA LEGIsLAZIONE
PENALE 543 (1986); Van Den Wyngaert, L'EspaceJudiciarieEuropien Faced L'Euroterrorisme
e la Sauvegarde des Droits Fondamentaux, 3 REv. INT'LE
TECHNIQUE 289 (1980).
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developed over the years;
iii. Establishing an international (universal) criminal jurisdiction along the lines of the 1953 United Nations Draft Statute
for Establishment of an International Criminal Court 3 or the
1980 Draft Statute for the Establishment of an International
Criminal Jurisdiction to Implement the International Con-

vention on the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid
Convention; 74
iv.

Establishing Regional International Criminal Courts.
The Proposed Model

This model could be used for a (Universal) International
Criminal Court, as well as for a Regional International Criminal Court, the latter being only limited in geography to StateParties from the region. The highlights of this proposal are
as follows:
1.

Establishment of the Tribunal
a.

The Tribunal would be established pursuant to a multilateral
convention (hereinafter referred to as the "Convention") open
to all States.

b.

The States-Parties to the Convention would agree on the establishment of the Tribunal whose location will be determined
by the Convention.

c.

The Tribunal would have an independent international legal
personality and would sign a host-country agreement with the
host-state. The Tribunal will thus have extra-territoriality for
its location and immunity for its personnel.

d.

The Tribunal's costs and facilities, including detentional facilities would be paid on a pro-rata basis by the State-Parties
to the convention.

e.

The Tribunal as an international organization would be granted
jurisdiction by the State-Parties to prosecute certain specified

73.

See supra note 33.

74. See supra note 35.
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offences embodied in the Annex to the Convention and would
have the authority to detain those accused, and those convicted
of the charges.
2.

Jurisdiction of the Tribunal and Applicable Law
a.

The jurisdiction of the Tribunal would be over persons for
those offences defined in the Annex to the Convention, as
amended, from time to time. [This would permit expanding
the list of crimes depending upon need, and also to allow StateParties to acquire confidence in the Tribunal.]

b.

The Court could have exclusive jurisdiction for some crimes
and derivative jurisdiction over others by virtue of a transfer
of the proceeding from a State-Party to the Convention,
provided the State-Party has jurisdiction on the basis of territoriality, active or passive personality. [This would avoid the
sovereignty problems that some claim would exist if the Tribunal would have exclusive or original jurisdiction. It would
also serve to circumvent problems of mandatory national prosecution if the laws of the state where the crime occurred so
require. Transfer of proceedings may also be done in a way
that would be similar in legal nature to a change of venue.
This approach coupled with the possibility of transfer of the
offender back to the state where the crime occurred would also
avoid many domestic legal difficulties.] Nothing, however, precludes the State-Parties from conferring exclusive jurisdiction
for certain crimes to the Tribunal. Thus, each State-Party that
has original jurisdiction based on territoriality, active or passive
personality would not lose jurisdiction, but merely transfer the
criminal proceedings to the Tribunal.

c.

To avoid problems of what substantive law to apply, the Tribunal would use the substantive law of the transferring state
or of the state where the offence was committed and its own
procedural rules which would be part of the Convention and
promulgated prior to the Tribunal's entry into function." [The

75.

See e.g., European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal

Matters, 15 May 1972, E.T.S. No. 73. See also M.C. BAsslouN & E. MOLLER-RAPPARD,
EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATrERS (1987).
76. The procedural rules would be on the basis of general principles of international law and in accordance with internationally protected human rights, particularly
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
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Tribunal's procedural rules would incorporate international human rights standards of due process and assure uniformity of
procedural treatment of all persons. The application of the
substantive law of the state where the offence was committed
is fair, and would assuage any exacerbated feelings of sovereignty that such a state may have in allowing the Tribunal to
prosecute those accused of committing crimes in their territory.]
3.

Prosecution
a.

The Tribunal's Procurator-General would act as the Chief
Prosecutor, but could be assisted by a prosecuting official of
the transferring state whose law is to be applied. [This too
would reinforce the change of venue approach and prevent the
claim that State-Parties totally relinquished jurisdiction.]

b.

Prosecution would commence on the basis of a criminal complaint brought by a State-Party (thus supporting State-Parties'
sovereignty). In addition, a State-Party that does not have
subject matter or in personam jurisdiction, or that does not wish
to bring a criminal complaint within its own jurisdiction, may
petition the Procurator-General of the Tribunal to"inquire into
the potential direct prosecution by the Tribunal. [This relieves
a State-Party from pressures in certain cases.] In such cases,
the request by a State-Party would be confidential, and only
after the Procurator-General of the Tribunal has deemed the
evidence sufficient will the case for prosecution be presented
to an Inquiry Chamber of the Tribunal in camera for its actioi.
In such a situation, the Tribunal's Procuracy and the Inquiry
Chamber would be acting as an international judicial board
of inquiry. 71 Once the Inquiry Chamber has decided to allow

16 Dec. 1966 and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official

Records Ser. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Cor. 1 (Jan. 7, 1970), 22 Nov. 1969; and
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 262, No. 5.

77. See "Draft Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry
and a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court," International Law Association, 60th Conference, Montreal, Aug. 29-Sept. 4, 1982, in Report of the 60th Conference
of the International Law Association (1983). For efforts to initiate such a commission see
U.N. Security Council Resolution 672 (1990) and Bassiouni, Iraq's Human-Rights Toll,
CHRISTAN SCIENCE MONTox, Nov. 26, 1990 at 19, which provides in part:

Recently, the Security Council resolved to establish an ad hoc commission
to investigate Israel's killing of some 20 Palestinians at Jerusalem's Temple
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prosecution, it would authorize the Procurator-General to issue
an indictment and request the surrender of the accused from

the State where the accused may be found. If that state is a
State-Party, it would be bound to surrender the accused. Any
other state may do so by the special treaty with the Tribunal
or on the basis of comity.

4.

c.

The Convention would include provisions on surrendering the
accused to the Tribunal and providing the Tribunal with legal
assistance (including administrative and judicial assistance) for
78
the procurement of evidence, both tangible and testimonial.

d.

By virtue of the Convention, an indictment by the Inquiry
Chamber, will be recognized by all State-Parties in much the
same way as other forms of recognition of foreign penal judgments. [National legislation could be amended whenever necessary to provide for such recognition.]

Conviction
a.

Upon conviction, the individual may be returned to the surrendering state, which will carry out the sentence on the basis
of provisions in the Convention, which would be in the nature
of "transfer of prisoners" agreements. 79 Alternatively, the convicted person can be transferred to any other State-Party on

Mount. Appropriate as that is, no one who views human rights as universal
can fail to note that the same measure was not resolved for Iraqi violations
- or, for that matter, for other more serious ones. Lest one forgets, 1.5
million people have been killed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, with
muted condemnation by powers quick to condemn Israel and now Iraq.
We must not have different scales to weigh human-rights violations, scales
dependent upon who the violator or the victim may be.
The tragic incidents in the Middle East can be an opportunity to enhance
human-rights protections by serving as an impetus to the establishment of
an impartial, permanent fact-finding commission. The time has come to
do something more than express selective verbal condemnations.
78. See e.g., The European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance, Apr. 20,
1959, E.T.S. No. 30; see M.C. BAssioum & E. MOLLER-RAPPARD, supra note 75. See

generally Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
in 2 M.C. BAssIouNI,

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE

151 (1986).

79. See e.g., The European Convention on Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar.
21, 1983, E.T.S. No. 112. See Epp, The European Convention on Transfer of Prisoners, in
2 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 253 (1986), and Bassiouni, Transfer of Prisoners Between tMe United States, Mexico, and Canada. Id., at 239. See
M.C. BAssbouN & E. MOLLER-RAPPARD, supra note 75.
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the same legal basis, or the Tribunal may place the convicted
person in its own detentional facilities, which would be established by the Convention in accordance with a host-state agreement between the Tribunal and the state wherein the detentional
facility would be established. [This provides a first option to
the State-Party where the crime was committed, to execute the
sentence, as well as a second option of allowing the transfer
to another State-Party in order to avoid the pressures and
problems that the detention of certain offenders can engender
or to have the Tribunal execute the sentence. A number of
States are already bound by treaties on transfer of prisoners
and the practice is well under way among more than thirty
countries.]
b.

A conviction by the Tribunal would be recognized by all StateParties on the basis of a provision in the Convention establishing recognition for such judgments similar to existing agreements on the same subject.

Other states may recognize such a judgment by special arrangement
with the Tribunal or on the basis of their domestic laws which could
be made to include recognition of the Tribunal's penal judgments.
[This would" expand the network of cooperating states to include those
states which may not become State-Parties but who would be willing
to cooperate with the Tribunal in some respect.]

5.

Composition of the Court
a.

b.

The Tribunal would consist of as many judges as there are
State-Parties to the Convention, but not less than thirteen.
There would be at least four Chambers of three judges each
and a Presiding Judge. The judges would be drawn by lot and
sit in rotation on the various chambers.
One of the chambers would act as the Inquiry Chamber while
the other chambers would be adjudicating chambers.

6.

Appeal
To provide for the right of appeal, the Tribunal sitting en banc
with a panel of nine judges would hear appeals excluding those
judges who decided the merits of the case.

7.

Selection of Judges
Each State-Party would appoint a judge from the ranks of its
judiciary or from distinguished members of the bar or from
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academia. The judges would be persons of high competence,
knowledgeable in international criminal law, and of high moral
character. Appointment of judges and their tenure would be
established by the Convention.
8.

Rules of the Tribunal
The Tribunal would be authorized to enact rules of practice
and procedures before it.

9.

Standing Committee of State-Parties
The State-Parties would hold an annual conference to review
the Tribunal's work and the Convention for purposes of amending it whenever needed and to ensue full compliance by the
State-Parties.

10.

The Organs of the Tribunal
These organs shall consist of:
The Court
1. The Court shall consist of twelve judges, no more than
two of whom shall be of the same nationality, who shall be
elected by the Standing Committee of States-Parties from
nominations submitted thereto.
2. Nominees for positions as judges shall be of distinguished
experts in the fields of international criminal law or human
rights and other jurists qualified to serve on the highest courts
of their respective states who may be of any nationality or
have no nationality.
3. Judges shall be elected by secret ballot and the Standing
Committee of States-Parties shall strive to elect persons representing diverse backgrounds and experience with due regard
to representation of the major legal and cultural systems of
the world.
4. Elections shall be coordinated by the Secretariat under
the supervision of the presiding officer of the Standing Committee of States-Parties and shall be held whenever one or
more vacancies exist on the Court.
5. Judges shall be elected for the following terms: four judges
for four-year terms, four judges for six-year terms, and four
judges for eight-year terms. Judges may be re-elected for any
term at any time available.
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No judge shall perform any public function in any state.

7. Judges shall have no other occupation or business than
that of judge of this Court. However, judges may engage in
scholarly activity for remuneration provided such activity in
no way interferes with their impartiality and appearance of
impartiality.
8. A judge shall perform no function in the Tribunal with
respect to any matter in which he may have had any involvement prior to his election to this Court.
9. A judge may withdraw from any matter at his discretion,
or be excused by a two-thirds majority of the judges of the
Court for reasons of conflict of interest.
10. Any judge who is unable or unwilling to continue to
perform functions under this statute may resign. A judge may
be removed for incapacity to fulfill his functions by a unanimous vote of the other judges of the Court.
11. Except with respect to judges who have been removed,
judges may continue in office beyond their term until their
replacements are prepared to assume the office and shall continue in office to complete work on any pending matter in
which they were involved even beyond their term.
12. The judges of the Court shall elect a president, vicepresident and such other officers as they deem appropriate.
The president shall serve for a term of two years.
13.

Judges of the Court shall perform their judicial functions
in three capacities:
a. 'Sitting with other judges as the Court en banc;
b.

Sitting in panels of three on a rotational basis in
chambers; and

c.

Sitting individually as supervisors of sanctions.

14. The salary of judges shall be equal to that of the judges
of the International Court of Justice.
15. The Court en banc shall, subject to the provisions of this
Statute, adopt rules governing procedures before its chambers
and the Court en banc, and provide for establishment and
rotation of chambers.
16.

The Court en banc shall announce its decisions orally in
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full or in summary, accompanied by written findings of fact
and conclusions of law at the time of the oral decision or
within thirty days thereafter, and any judge so desiring may
issue a concurring or dissenting opinion.
17. Decisions and orders of the Court en banc are effective
upon certification of the written opinion by the Secretariat,
which is to communicate such certified opinion to parties
forthwith.
18. The Court en banc may, within thirty days of the certification of the judgment, enter its decisions without notice.
19. No actions taken by the Tribunal may be contested in
any other forum than before the Court en banc, and in the
event that any effort to do so is made, the Procurator shall
be competent to appear on behalf of the Tribunal and in the
name of all States-Parties of this Statute to oppose such action.
20. States-Parties agree to enforce the final judgments of the
Court in accordance with the provisions of this Statute.
The Procuracy
1. The Procuracy shall have the Procurator as its chief officer
and shall consist of an administrative division, an investigative
division and a prosecutorial division, each headed by a deputy
Procurator, and employing appropriate staff.
2. The Procurator shall be elected by the Standing Committee of States-Parties from a list of at least three nominations
submitted by members of the Standing Committee, and shall
serve for a renewable term of six years, barring resignation
or removal by two-thirds vote of the judges of the Court en
banc for incompetence, conflict of interest, or manifest disregard of the provisions of this Statute or material rules of
the Tribunal.
3. The Procurator's salary shall be the same as that of the
judges.
4. The deputy procurators and all other members of the
Procurator's staff shall be named and removed by the Procurator at will.
The Secretariat
1. The Secretariat shall have as its chief officer the Secretary,
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who shall be elected by a majority of the Court sitting en bane
and serve for a renewable term of six years barring resignation
or removal by a majority of the Court sitting en bane for
incompetence, conflict of interest or manifest disregard of the
provisions of this Statute or material rules of the Tribunal.
2. The Secretary's salary shall be equivalent to that of the
judges.
3. The Secretariat shall employ such staff as appropriate to
perform its chancery and administrative functions and such
other functions as may be assigned to it by the Court that
are consistent with the provisions of this Statute and the rules
of the Tribunal.
4.

In particular, the Secretary shall twice each year:
a. Prepare budget requests for each of the organs
of the Tribunal; and
b. Make and publish an annual report on the activities of each organ of the Tribunal.

5. The Secretariat staff shall be appointed and removed by
the Secretary at will.
6. An annual summary of investigations undertaken by the
Procuracy shall be presented to the Secretariat for publication,
but certain investigations may be omitted where secrecy is
necessary, provided that a confidential report of the investigation is made to the Court and to the Standing Committee
and filed separately with the Secretariat. Either the Court or
the Standing Committee may order by majority vote that the
report be made public.
The Standing Committee
1. The Standing Committee shall consist of one representative appointed by each State-Party.
2. The Standing Committee shall elect by majority vote a
presiding officer and alternate presiding officer and such other
officers as it deems appropriate.
3. The presiding officer shall convene meetings at least twice
each year of at least one week duration, each at the seat of
the Tribunal, and call other meetings at the request of a
majority vote of the committee.
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4. The Standing Committee shall have the power to perform
the functions expressly assigned to it under this Convention,
plus any other functions that it determines appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Tribunal that are not
inconsistent with the Convention, but in no way shall those
functions impair th e independence and integrity of the Court
as a judicial body.
5.

In particular, the Standing Committee may:
a. Offer to mediate disputes between States-Parties
relating to the functions of the Tribunal; and
b.

Encourage states to accede to the Convention.

6. The Standing Committee shall propose to States-Parties
international instruments to enhance the functions of the
Tribunal.
7. The Standing Committee may exclude from participation
representatives of States-Parties that have failed to provide
financial support for the Tribunal as required by this Statute
or States-Parties that failed to carry out their obligations under
this Statute.
8. Upon request by the Procuracy, or by a party to a case
presented for adjudication to a chamber of the Court, the
Standing Committee may be seized with a mediation and
conciliation petition. In that case, the Standing Committee
shall within 60 days decide on granting or denying the petition,
from which decision there is no appeal. In the event that the
Standing Committee grants the petition, Court proceedings
shall be stayed until such time as the Standing Committee
concludes its mediation and conciliation efforts, but not for
more than one year except by stipulation of the parties and
with the consent of the Court. 80
Conclusion
We no longer live in a world where narrow conceptions of jurisdiction and sovereignty can stand in the way of an effective system of

80.

M.C. Bassiouni, supra note 37, at 236-44, and Draft Statute: International

Criminal Tribunal, supra note 38.
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international cooperation for the prevention and control of international
and transnational criminality. If the United States and the Soviet Union
can accept mutual verification of nuclear arms controls, then surely
they and other countries can accept a tribunal to prosecute not only
drug traffickers and terrorists, but also those whose actions constitute
such international crimes as aggression, war crimes, crimes against
humanity and torture.
Many of the international crimes for which the Court would have
jurisdiction are the logical extension of international protection of human
rights." Without enforcement, these rights are violated with impunity.
We owe it to the victims of these crimes and to our own human and
intellectual integrity to reassert the values we believe in by at least
attempting to prosecute such offenders. When such a process is institutionalized, it can operate impartially and fairly. We cannot rely on
the sporadic episodes of the victorious prosecuting the defeated and
then dismantle these ad hoc structures as we did with the Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals. The permanency of an international criminal
tribunal acting impartially and fairly irrespective of whom the accused
may be is the best policy for the advancement of the international rule
of law and for the prevention and control of international and transnational criminality.
An international criminal court will surely be established one day.
In the meantime, however, we will have to remain with the bitter
realization that, if it had existed earlier, it could have deterred certain
people and thus prevented some victimization. The conscience of world
leaders should be bothered by this prospect, especially when they oppose
the idea on the basis that it might infringe on jealously guarded notions
of sovereignty.
Justice Robert Jackson as Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg
International Military Tribunal stated in his opening speech: "This
principle of personal liability is a necessary as well as a logical one if
International Law is to render real help to the maintenance of peace
....
Only sanctions which reach individuals can peacefully and effectively be enforced .... [T]he idea that a State . . . commits crimes,
is a fiction. Crimes always are committed only by persons. ' 82 It is

81. See Bassiouni, The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the
Processes of International Protection of Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 193
(1982), reprinted in 1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES, 15

(1986).
82. 1 THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING AT NUREMBERo GERMANY, 82-83 (1946).
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35

unconscionable at this stage of the world's history, and after so much
human harm has already occurred, that abstract notions of sovereignty
can still shield violators of international criminal law or that the limited
views and lack of vision and faith by government officials can prevent
the establishment of such an important and needed international institution. The time has come for us to think and act in conformity
with the values, ideals and goals we profess.
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Appendix I
I.
A.

Establishment of an International Criminal Court

OFFICIAL TEXTS

1. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes
(First Hague, I), signed at The Hague, 19 July 1899, 26 MARTENS
NouvEu RECUEIL DES TRAITES (2d) 720, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. No. 342
(entered into force 4 Sept. 1900).
2. Convention Relative to the Establishment of an International Prize
Court (Second Hague, XII), signed at The Hague, 18 Oct. 1907, 3
MARTENS NouvEAu RECUEIL DES TRAITES (3d) 688 (never entered into
force).
3. Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), signed at
Versailles, 28 June 1919, 11 MARTENS NouvEAu RECUEIL DES TRAITES
(3d) 323 (entered into force 10 Jan. 1920).
4. Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court,
opened for signature at Geneva, 16 Nov. 1937, League of Nations
O.J. Spec. in Supp. No. 156 (1938), League of Nations Doc. C.547
(I).M.384(I).1937, (1938) (never entered into force).
5. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War
Criminals of the European Axis (London Agreement), signed at London, 8 Aug. 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472
(entered into force, 8 Aug. 1945), ANNEX, Charter of the International
Military Tribunal (Nuremberg).
6. International Military Tribunal For the Far East Proclaimed at
Tokyo, 19 Jan. 1946 and amended 26 Apr. 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589
(entered into force 19 Jan. 1946), ANNEX Charter of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo).
7. Control Council Law No. 10 (Punishment of Persons Guilty of
-War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity), adopted
at Berlin, 20 Dec. 1945, Official Gazette of the Control Council for
Germany, No. 3, Berlin, 31 Jan. 1946.
8. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (Annex to the
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 31
Aug. 1951), 7 GAOR Supp. 11, U.N. Doc. A/2136 (1952) at 23.
9. Revised Draft Statute for an International Court (Annex to the
Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 20
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Aug. 1953), 9 GAOR Supp. 12, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954), at 21.
10. Draft Statute for the Creation of an International Criminal Jurisdiction to Implement the International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 19 Jan. 1980, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1416.
B.

UNOFFICIAL TEXTS

1. Report on the Creation of an International Criminal Jurisdiction,
by V.V. Pella to the Interparliamentary Union, XXII Conference,
held in Berne and Geneva, 1924, in L'Union Interparliamentaire. Compte
Rendu de la XXII Conference tenue a Berne et a Geneva en 1924, public par
le Bureau Interparliamentaire,1925, see also L'Union Interparliamentaire.Compte
rendu de la XXIII Conference tenue a Washington et a Ottowa en 1925 (1925).
2. Projet D'Une Cour Criminelle Internationale, adopted by the International Law Association at its 34th Conference in Vienna, Aug.,
1926, The InternationalLaw Association, Report of the 34th Conference, Vienna,
Aug. 5-11, 1926 (1927).
3. Project of the International Association of Penal Law, in Actes du
Premier Congres Internationalde Droit Pnal,Bruxelles, 26-29June 1926 (1927)
and Projet de Statut pour la Creation d'une Chambre Criminelle au
Sein de la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale, presented by
the International Association of Penal Law to the League of Nations
in 1927, 5 REvUE INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PANAL (1928).
4. Constitution et Procedure D'un Tribunal Approprie pur juger de
la Responsabilite des Auteurs des Crime de Guerre, presente a la
Conference des Preliminaires de Paix par la Commission des Responsabilites des Auteurs de la Guerre et Sanctions, III, La Paix de Versailles
(1930).
5. Project for the Establishment of a Convention for the Creation of
a United National Tribunal for War Crimes, established by the United
Nations War Crimes Commission, 1944, see UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION (Wright ed. 1948).
6. L'Union Interparliamentaire.Compte rendu de la XXVII Conference tenue
a Rome en 1948 (1949).
7.

Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, in J.

AND

R.

(1970).
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8. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Foundation for
the Establishment of an InternationalCriminalCourt (Wingspread Conference,
September 1971).
9. Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Work Paper,
Abidjan World Conference on World Peace Through Law, Aug. 26-31, (1973).
10. Draft Statute for an International Commission of Criminal Inquiry
and a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, International
Law Association, 60th Conference, Montreal, Aug. 29-Sept. 4, 1982,
in Report of the 60th Conference of the International Law Association (1983).
II.

A.

Instruments on the Codification of Substantive
International Criminal Law

OFFICIAL TEXTS

1. 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. 9 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 9, U.N. DOC. A/2693.
2. Draft International Criminal Code, Presented by the AIDP to the
6th U.N. Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, 1980). U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/NGO 213. Updated in
M.C.

BASSIOUNI,

A

DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE AND

STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL

(1987).

DRAFT
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Appendix II

CHRONOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY U.S.
POSITIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT*
13 Feb. 1978: Resolution adopted by the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association. It urges the US State Department to open
negotiations for a convention for the establishment of an International
Criminal Court, with jurisdiction expressly limited to a) hijacking, b)
violence aboard aircraft, c) crimes against diplomats and internationally
protected persons, and d) murder and kidnapping.
13 Mar. 1986: Statement of Secretary of State George Schultz before
the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations. The agenda is "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987." Schultz responds to Senator Specter during his testimony that "we need to be working on the
web of law that can operate here, and in conjunction with others around
the world to say to terrorists that they have no place to hide and they
are going to get prosecuted."
25,June 1986: Senator Specter presents Amendment 2187 on the Senate
floor and comments on his proposal. The amendment states in part
that "rampant terrorism by its very nature threatens world order and
thereby all civilized nations and their citizens; any and every nation
has the right, under current principles of international law, to assert
jurisdiction over offenses considered to be 'universal crimes', such as
piracy and slavery, in order to protect sovereign authority, universal
values, and the interests of mankind." Specter, in the amendment,
also suggests that the President establish an international criminal court
that would have jurisdiction over the crime of international terrorism.
He acknowledges that because of issues of sovereignty, various nations
might be reluctant to act together on such an initiative. He argues
nevertheless that "if these crimes were prosecuted in a world tribunal,
there could be no question that such prosecutions . . . would have
much greater force and much greater weight than those prosecutions
in an individual state." The amendment was agreed to.

* This chronology was prepared by Charles Bataglia, Assistant to United
States Senator Arlen Specter. It was slightly edited by the author.
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27 Aug. 1986: Public Law 99-399, the Omnibus Security and Terrorism
Act mandates the President to consider "the possibility of eventually
establishing an international tribunal for prosecuting terrorists." This
Act also includes an amendment (Chapter 113A) to Part I of title 18,
United States Code which defines and stipulates penalties for terrorist
acts abroad committed against US nationals.
16 June 1988: Testimony of Secretary of State George Schultz before
the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Appropriations. The agenda is "Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for fiscal Year 1989." Senator Specter asks Secretary Schultz whether it would be "useful" to "push ahead with an
international tribunal for the trial of these kinds of international criminals [terrorists]." Secretary Schultz replies that "it may be an important
possibility," and notes that "over a period of years now more and
more usefulness of the rule of law in getting at terrorism and drug
trafficking."
1988: Senator Specter includes a provision in the Omnibus Anti-Drug
Abuse Act calling on the President to pursue negotiations to establish
an international criminal court with jurisdiction over international drug
trafficking.
2 Mar. 1989: House Concurrent Resolution 66, submitted by Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa. The resolution calls for "the creation of
an International Criminal Court with jurisdiction over internationally
recognized crimes of terrorism, illicit narcotics trafficking, genocide,
and torture, as those crimes are defined in various international
conventions. "
15 Mar. 1989: Floor Statement by Senator Specter on international
terrorism. Specter recalls that in a 1986 amendment to the Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorist Act and in Section 4108 of the
1988 Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Congress called on the President
to pursue negotiations to establish an international court with jurisdiction over terrorism and drug trafficking. He goes on to say that his
discussions with various foreign leaders have persuaded him that "the
civilized international community is prepared to speak with one voice
to condemn terrorism." The creation of an international criminal court,
he concludes, "would be an eloquent expression of that condemnation."
15 Mar. 1989: Testimony of Secretary of State Baker before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Committee on Appropriations.
Senator Specter asks Secretary Baker what he thinks of the possibility
of an international court. Secretary Baker calls the idea "interesting,"
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but says it has "some fundamental problems." For instance, there are
the questions of who would conduct the investigations, who would bring
the prosecutions, and the exact composition of the court. Still, Baker
admits "we could probably reach some sort of a United States position
on that and then after some period of time, perhaps an international
agreement." He concludes that the idea of an international court is
worthy of further consideration.
Autumn 1989: The United Nations places the question of establishing
an international criminal court for illicit drug traffickers on the Fall
agenda of the UN General Assembly.
20 Nov. 1989: UN General Assembly Agenda Item 152 (44th session,
Sixth' [Legal] Committee). This resolution, following three days of
intense debate, requests that the International Law Commission address
the possibility of establishing "an international criminal court or other
criminal trial mechanism," the jurisdiction of which would include
illicit trans-national drug trafficking.
18 June 1990: Floor Statement by Senator Specter. Specter describes
a symposium held at his request to discuss the creation of an international criminal court. At the 10 May 1990 symposium chaired by
Professor M.C. Bassiouni, 13 international criminal law scholars and
government officials joined by Congressmen Bob Kastenmeier and Jim
Leach, expressed a consensus that "a regional international criminal
court of limited scope and powers had the potential for making a
significant contribution in the area of narcotics trafficking and should
be further explored." Specter includes in the Congressional Record a
copy of the written consensus drafted at the symposium.
24-28 June 1990: The Draft Statute for an International Criminal
Tribunal prepared by Professor M.C. Bassiouni and discussed at the
May 10 symposium is presented to a special committee of experts
organized by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences. A model draft statute to establish an international criminal
tribunal is prepared and in August, 1990 the Committee submits it to
the Eighth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and the
Treatment of Offenders.
16 July 1990: Draft Report of the International Law Commission on
the work of its 42nd session in Geneva (1 May - 20 July 1990). In
Chapter II, Part C of this report, the Commission considers, and agrees
in principle with, the idea of establishing a permanent international
criminal court "to be brought into relationship with the United Nations
system." The commission notes that there are at least three possible
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models: 1) an international criminal court with exclusive jurisdiction,
2) concurrent jurisdiction between an international criminal court and
national courts, and 3) an international criminal court having only a
review competence. Professor S. McCaffery of the U.S. and a member
of the ILC supports the report.
7 Aug. 1990: President Cesar Oaviria Trujillo of Colombia, who had
planned to attend the Siracusa meeting of June 1990 (but sent three
representatives who briefed him on it), vowed in his inaugural address
to "explore the possibility of creating an international or regional
criminal jurisdiction to fight narco-trafficking and other related crimes
that surpass international borders."
4 Sept. 1990: Testimony of Secretary of State Baker before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee points out that "defendants of the nature
of Saddam Hussein or for that matter Pol Pot" do not answer to any
judicial authority, Congressman Leach asks Secretary Baker to look
seriously at the idea of creating an international criminal court. Secretary Baker replies that he thinks "the suggestion is a good one" and
wonders "why that's not something that had been looked at before, if
indeed it hasn't been."
10 Sept. 1990: Testimony of Under Secretary of State Robert Kimmitt
before House Foreign Affairs Committee. Kimmitt states that the Leach
and Specter proposals would be "enormously complex" undertakings,
noting, for instance, that if the State Department wanted to go forward
on these proposals, it would have to come to the Senate for advice
and consent first. Still, Kimmitt expresses "no disagreement at all"
on the mechanism and the principle involved in the Leach proposal.
He adds, in fact, that he would like to bring in lawyers in other agencies
and departments who are working right now on the Gulf situation.
Kimmitt concludes that 'the time is probably riper than ever to look
closely at that situation." (international criminal jurisdiction).
11 Sept. 1990: By a vote of 97 to 2, the US Senate endorsed the idea
of trying Saddam Hussein before an international tribunal.
19 Sept. 1990: During Congressional Testimony, Congressman Gus
Yatron asked John Bolton, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau
of International Organization Affairs, for his comment on House Concurrent Resolution 66, the House measure promoting the proposed
court. Bolton said that the Department of State was open to discussing
the merits of the court.
19 Oct. 1990: By unanimous consent, the Senate passes an amendment
to the FY 91 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. The amendment
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calls for the President to report to the Congress by October 1, 1991,
the results of his efforts in regard to the establishment of an International
Criminal Court to deal with criminal acts defined in international
conventions. It also requires the Judicial Conference of the United
States to report to the Congress by October 1, 1991 on the feasibility
of, and the relationship to, the Federal Judiciary of an international
criminal court.
25 Oct. 1990: In conference on the FY 91 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, House conferees recede to the Senate's position on the
Specter amendment. The bill passes the Congress and is signed into
law by the President on
5 Nov. 1990: President Bush signs into Law the FY 91 Foreign Operations Appropriations which includes the Specter amendment.
1990: The U.S. is among the sponsors of the UN General Assembly
declaring the nineties as the Decade of International Law.

